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A Thursday, October 1985. A discussion between two people, "Z" and
I.
Z: The integral role played by appellate case report analysis in modern
legal education reminds me of a bumper sticker I saw recently: "United
States Get Out of North America."
T: How is that slogan analogous to the role played by appellate case
report analysis in legal education?
Z: It's almost as difficult to imagine a legal education without appellate
case report analysis - or even reduced amounts of such analysis - as
it is to imagine North America without the United States. Perhaps it is
time, however, to begin picturing an alternative to legal education
orthodoxy.1
T: Why?
Z: Because the excessive reliance on appellate case report analysis in
traditional legal education fails to provide students with enough of the
individual skills necessary for good lawyering or an appropriate under-
standing of what is supposed to be accomplished through the legal edu-
cation process.2 Students do not learn during their education how the
* Special thanks to Niki Martin and Nancy Kelly Sanguigni for their able assis-
tance as well as to the many others - including M.S., C.H., A.F., T.C., D.H. and R.B.
- who provided useful comments and suggestions.
1. "[L]egal education orthodoxy" refers to the dominant modern system of legal
education in the United States which relies on appellate case report analysis - and,
specifically, doctrinal analysis - as its centerpiece.
2. "A consensus is emerging that law schools must equip their graduates with
more of the skills they will need in practice and impart to them a broader perspective
1
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different things they do in school - from case analysis to clinical train-
ing to simulation - relate to each other or to actual lawyering. Among
the more significant consequences of the over-reliance on appellate case
report analysis are: the neglect of important lawyering skills such as
listening, 3 legal writing,4 and fact arrangement;5 the misleading infer-
ence to students that case analysis dominates lawyering in the same
way it dominates legal education;6 the ommission of a more accurate
on the important role they are to play in society." "Academic Planning Project: Interim
Report," UNIVERSITY OF MONTANA SCHOOL OF LAW, 3 (1983) [hereinafter cited as
Montana Report]. "Surveys of recent law graduates and current law students indicate
that both agree on the desirability of greater law school emphasis on various skills
important to the practicing lawyer. [However, the law students exhibit] great confusion
about precisely what training is practical." "Report and Recommendations of the Task
Force on Lawyer Competency: The Role of the Law Schools, American Bar Associa-
tion Section of Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar," at 14, n. 4 and 5 (1979)
[hereinafter cited as ABA Report].
The contemporary crisis in American legal education is that "[w]e are unable to
identify a common purpose other than training in the kind of 'knowledge, analytical
skills, and insight' that are needed to perform effectively, as lawyers." Berman, The
Crisis of Legal Education in America, 24 B.C.L. REV. 347, 350 (1985) [hereinafter
cited as Berman].
3. The skill of listening is a necessary prerequisite to the exercise of many other
lawyering skills and therefore should receive much more attention than it does.
4. "Law schools should provide every student [with] at least one rigorous writing
experience in each year of law study." ABA Report at 3.
5.
Law schools should provide instruction in those fundamental skills critical
to lawyer competence. In addition to being able to analyze legal problems
and do legal research, a competent lawyer must be able effectively to
write, communicate orally, gather facts, interview, counsel and negotiate.
Instruction in such areas need not and should not be approached less rigor-
ously than those traditionally emphasized in law schools, nor should they
be viewed as 'training' that is somehow detached from the research and
academic mission of the school.
Id. at 3, 16.
6.
[The invention of appellate case report analysis] is responsible for confin-
ing legal education in a strait mold which was to dissociate it from the
living context of the world about it. Disregarded were the broad premises
for the study of law . . . unrecognized was the fact that prospective law-
yers needed training in various areas of learning and skill.
Harno, Legal Education in the United States, READINGS IN THE HISTORY OF THE
AMERICAN LEGAL PROFESSION, 220 (Nolan ed. 1980) [hereinafter cited as Harno].
"[C]ase instruction, by focusing on the abstract legal principles propounded by the
highest courts, distorts and falsifies what it teaches by ignoring the significance of the
[Vol. 10
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multi-dimensional conception of law, legal problems and legal analysis;
the inability of too many students to overcome attention to minutae in
cases and to see the forest for the trees; and the effective discourage-
ment of students engaged in case analysis from playing an active, in-
volved role in their education.7 I would propose, therefore, that case
analysis generally, and doctrinal analysis specifically, be de-
emphasized.
T: What would you offer in its place?
Z: I would propose an alternative model of legal education that in-
cludes case analysis, but which focuses on an array of specific lawyer-
ing skills such as listening, fact gathering, issue formulation, and effec-
tive communication, as well as a better integration of the different
layers or perspectives of the law. The model promotes the direct prac-
tice of these skills both inside and outside the classroom. It promotes
skills learning primarily by switching the emphasis from case analysis
to legal problem solving. The problem solving approach, rather than
being derived from predominantly "prepared" appellate cases, more
closely parallels cases as they might actually be presented by clients.
The heart of these problems are unprocessed - or minimally processed
- facts.
Through the second significant characteristic of the model, ap-
proaching legal problems from different perspectives, students are
taught to recognize and understand the various dimensions of legal
analysis within a single legal problem - the ethical, moral, political,
advocacy and doctrinal dimensions, among others. In addition to teach-
ing students about what the different dimensions of a problem are, stu-
dents should also be shown how the various dimensions of a legal prob-
lem, and even an entire legal education - doctrines, themes, and
courses - fit together.
This new model affords students the opportunity not only to learn
and practice fundamental lawyering skills, but to obtain a broader un-
facts of a particular case to lower courts, and the role of trial courts, administrative
agencies and legislatures." J. SELIGMAN, THE HIGH CITADEL: THE INFLUENCE OF
HARVARD LAW SCHOOL, 157 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Seligman].
"[The case method's] emphasis upon rigorous doctrinal analysis set constricting
limits .... Preparing students only for mastery of judge- made law, it deluded practi-
tioners into believing that law was a science, not policy, and that other scholarly disci-
plines, and even practical experience had nothing to offer." J. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL
JUSTICE: LAWYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN MODERN AMERICA, 79, 80 (1976).
7. "From [the students'] point of view, close reading of cases seems inefficient
and pointless, and they resist it." Montana Report at 6.
1986]
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derstanding, or "big picture", of the legal education process and of
lawyering while still in school. By permitting students to observe the
nexus between lawyering, legal training and the rationales underlying
the educational methods used, by providing students with a general
roadmap of an effective education, and by promoting more active stu-
dent involvement in the educational process, the new model should
avoid many of the deficiencies caused by an over-reliance on case re-
port analysis in legal education orthodoxy.
II.
T: Why do you have such a concern?
Z: There are three reasons - the responsibility of law schools to the
students, to the profession, and to the public. For the students, law
schools take three years of their lives. Schools owe them something for
that. Schools then send their graduating students off to become mem-
bers of the legal profession, sometimes for life. Schools owe the profes-
sion something for that. And schools can influence the way students
practice law on behalf of clients. So schools owe the public as well. The
real problem, therefore, is not whether the quality of legal education is
important, but how to improve that quality.
T: Before you suggest how to improve the quality of legal education
today, could you state why the modern legal education needs changing?
Z: Let me present my case. A good place to begin is with the historical
antecedents of the case analysis method of legal instruction. For that,
we must journey back to the colonial era. At that time, the dominant
form of a lawyer's education was the apprenticeship. 8 Generally, an
apprentice learned through the observation of an experienced lawyer or
through practice.9 Some books were used in the apprentice's education,
8. "In the Seventeenth and first half of the Eighteenth Century prospective law-
yers lacked the funds to finance a trip to England [to study in the inns of court].
Consequently they either studied on their own or with a practitioner." McKirdy, The
Lawyer as Apprentice: Legal Education in Eighteenth Century Massachusetts, READ-
INGS IN THE HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROFESSION, 198 (Nolan ed. 1980)
[hereinafter cited as McKirdy]. A. CHROUST, 2, THE RISE OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION
IN AMERICA 173 (1965).
9. A prospective lawyer would enter the office of a bar member and absorb the
law "by study, observation and occasionally by direct teaching from his senior." C.
WARREN. 1 HISTORY OF THE HARVARD LAW SCHOOL AND OF EARLY LEGAL CONDI-
TIONS IN AMERICA, 132 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Warren].
[Vol. 10
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but the scarcity of books served as a built-in limitation.10
Soon after the Revolutionary War, law schools and organized legal
instruction became more common.1 The instruction generally consisted
of veteran lawyers dispensing their collected wisdom to eager
students. 2
In the early 1800's, students received their legal training at inns of
court, at the offices of practicing attorneys, and at law schools.Y3 The
quality and quantity of education varied considerably.'" In 1871, a
revolution of sorts occurred. Christopher Columbus Langdell, then a
professor at the Harvard Law School,' 5 published a landmark book evi-
dencing a radical new perspective on the methodology of legal instruc-
tion.' 6 In his book, A Selection of Cases on the Law of Contracts,'7
appellate case reports were gathered under one cover for the purpose of
systematic study.'
The impact of the book was both immediate and controversial.
The book generated supporters who felt that Langdell's selection of ap-
pellate case reports created "consistency out of what seemed a chaos of
conflicting actions."' 9 Detractors, however, concluded that:
10. "Acquisition of the law is difficult without ready means of access to the
books of the law and these were sadly lacking in the American Provinces." Prior to
1776, only thirty-three law books including at least eight repeated editions were even
printed in America, most of which were manuals and treatises. Warren at 126, n. 1.
11. "Formalized apprenticeship, together with the severing of ties with England,
also led to the establishment of private law school." R. STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL
EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE 1850S TO THE 1980s, 3, n. 7 (1970) [hereinafter
cited as Stevens]. "With the close of the Revolutionary War there began a new era in
legal education. [T]he first American law professorship was founded . . . in 1779."
Warren at 165, 169.
12. "[The newly established law schools] were generally outgrowths
of the law offices of practitioners who had shown themselves to be particularly skilled,
or popular as teachers." Stevens at 3, n. 7.
13. See supra notes 7 & 9.
14. "[Students'] individual experiences were as varied as the men who trained
them." McKirdy at 202.
15. Christopher Columbus Langdell began his professorship at Harvard Law
School on February 21, 1870. On September 27, 1870 the law school's faculty elected
Langdell to be the law school's first dean. Langdell retired in 1895. Seligman at 32, 42.
16. Langdell changed the way law was taught with the invention of the casebook
in 1871. See id. at 33, 45.
17. Harno at 218.
18. See Chase, Origins of Modern Professional Education: The Harvard Case
Method Conceived As Clinical Instruction in Law, 5 NOVA L.J. 323, 334 (1981).
19. C. WARREN, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN BAR 550 (1911).
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There is just as much sense in endeavoring to instruct students in
the principles of law by the exclusive reading of cases as there
would be in endeavoring to instruct the students of West Point Mil-
itary Academy in the art of war by compelling them to read the
official reports of all the leading battles which have been fought in
the world's history.20
Langdell's case method approach to legal instruction provided
great impetus to the view of law as a pure academic science.2' Stated
one observer: "The very heart of the case method was the assumption
that the cases, once they were sorted out and properly classified, would
themselves fall into patterns suggesting the true underlying princi-
ples."' 22 The cases were "the data from which the true legal principles
could be derived. ' 23 Langdell strongly agreed with this view. He stated,
for example, that:
Law, considered as a science, consists of certain principles or doc-
trines . . . the growth [of which] is to be traced in the main
through a series of cases; and much the shortest if not the best, if
not the only, way of mastering the doctrine effectively is by study-
ing the cases in which it is embodied. 24
This view of the law and the accompanying case method eventu-
ally spread throughout the legal education community by the second
decade of the twentieth century. 25 The influence of Langdellian ortho-
20. Id. at 551.
21. Woodard, The Limits of Legal Realism: An Historical Perspective, 54 VA.
L. REV. 689, 699, 713 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Woodard].
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. C. LANGDELL, Preface to A SELECTION OF CASES ON THE LAW OF CON-
TRACTS (1871). See also Harno at 306.
25. "By the early twentieth century, Langdell's casebook approach to teaching
law was well established." Seligman at 45.
In those days [1890] at least, it was not obvious that LangdelI's law school
would sweep the country ... the ultimate triumph of that system, even in
the narrow world of the university-affiliated day law school, was not ap-
parent until at least 1910 when the West Publishing Company thought
that the market was large enough to support an entire series of case books.
Ronefsky & Schlegel, Mirror, Mirror On the Wall: Histories of American Law
Schools, 95 HARV. L. REv., 833, 837 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Ronefsky]. See also
2 AM. L. SCH. REV. 276 (1909).
See also Feinman & Feldman, Pedagogy and Politics, 73 GEo. L.J. 875, 882
[Vol. 10
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doxy grew to the extent that law school appeared to be a "three year
graduate program of 'pure law' taught from cases."26
T: But that was long ago. A lot has changed over the years.
Z: True. But the significance of the Langdellian case method approach
to legal education lies in its imprimateur on modem legal education
orthodoxy. Langdell's case method approach has transcended genera-
tions of lawyers and law teachers.2 7 In many law classes, the study of
appellate case reports has become the sole pedagogical tool, and stu-
dents as well as teachers have come to believe that the only resource
necessary for an adequate legal education is a bound volume of appel-
late case reports. As a by-product of this emphasis, however, social con-
text has been given less than adequate attention, as have political over-
tones, ideologies, and for the most part, competing methods of
instruction. 28
T: The case analysis method and its "law-as-science" underpinnings
did have some opposition; didn't they?
Z: Yes. A prime illustration was the movement known as legal real-
ism,2 which occurred after World War I. This movement rejected the
(1985); Kennedy, Toward an Historical Understanding of Legal Consciousness: The
Case of Classical Legal Thought in America 1850-1940, 3 Ras. in L. Soc. 3 (1980); R.
UNGER, LAW IN MODERN SocIErY.(1977).
26. Ronefsky at 833, 837.
27.
In the next seven decades, Langdell's model of legal education would
spread from Harvard Law School and become the model for virtually
every American law school. After Langdell's retirement, the spread of the
case method quickened. By 1902, 12 of the 98 law schools had unequivo-
cally accepted the case system; by 1908, over 30.
Seligman at 42, 43.
28. "The trouble is not with the students. The trouble is with the educational
process, its materials and the environment where law school law is pronounced. Law
school 'law' is the law pronounced in the courtroom by an appellate court." Brown, The
Trouble With Law School Education: A Consultation As A Microcosm, 18 CREIGH-
TON L. REV. 1343, 1347 (1985). "Law teachers and law students of 1984 are more one-
sided, and more mistaken in their view of the nature of law than were their predeces-
sors in any other period of American history." Berman at 348.
"The near universal emulation of Harvard Law School'[s] [use of appellate case
reports as the sole teaching tool] has limited the emergence of rival theories of legal
education." Seligman at 201.
However, other forms of instruction such as lectures did persist. See Ronefsky at
833, 837.
29. "Legal realism" is a philosophy essentially founded in the late 1920's by a
group of legal scholars who believed that "law is, basically, an argumentative tech-
1986]
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view of law as a science. 30 This movement attempted to reconnect law
to the social sciences, and to debunk the legal scientists' narrow con-
ception of law as a self-informing group of principles found in appellate
case reports.3 ' The legal realist critique, while focused primarily on ju-
dicial decision-making, spilled over to the methods used in legal in-
struction. Professor Leon Green, for example, reacted to the traditional
organization of casebooks by legal concepts by organizing his 1965
torts casebook, The Judicial Process in Torts Cases,32 functionally by
subject matter - such as automobile accidents. "Green seemed to be
saying that the participants in a case, the atmosphere it created, and
the interests at stake were what determined its outcome, quite indepen-
dent of rules and principles."3 3 Karl Llewellyn's The Bramble Bush 4
further illustrates this position.
T: How?
Z: Llewellyn wrote:
So of the cases. Put yourself into them; dig beneath the surface,
make your experience count, bring out the story, and you have here
dramatic tales that stir, that make the cases stick, that weld your
law into the whole of culture. These are the parties. There are, as
well, the judges: working out, shaping the law to human needs. In
every case the drama of society unrolls before you - in all its
grandeur, in all its humor, in all its futility, in the eternal wonder
of the coral reef. . . . Humanity and law - not two, but one.3 5
Thus, to Llewellyn and other realists, the doctrinal synthesis of the
rule of law constituted an artificial "laboratory" far-removed from real-
nique. The judge, it is thought, decides on the basis of his political, economic, or psy-
chological prejudices; legal reasons are merely rationalization." Berman at 349; Selig-
man at 50.
30. One commentator stated: "The major tenet of the functional [realist] ap-
proach which they have so vigorously espoused, is that law is instrumental only, a
means to an end, and is to be appraised only in light of the end it achieves." McDou-
gal, Fuller v. the American Legal Realist: An Intervention, 50 YALE L. J. 8027, 8034-
35 (1941); Woodard at 717.
31. See, e.g., Hutchinson & Monahan, Law Politics and the Critical Legal
Scholars: The Unfolding Drama of American Legal Thought, 36 STAN. L. REV. 199,
204 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Hutchinson].
32. L. GREEN, THE LITIGATION PROCESS IN TORT LAW (1965).
33. G. WHITE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA: AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 85 (1980).
34. K. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH (1960).
35. Id. at 127-128.
502 [Vol. 10
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ity that did not reflect the true nature of the politics of law. A legal
education methodology based on doctrinal synthesis of the rule of law,
moreover, was equally suspect.
T: Have there been any recent critiques of legal education?
Z: Yes, there have been several recent strains of attack on legal educa-
tion orthodoxy. The recent attacks range from disagreements with the
law-as-science underpinnings of doctrinal analysis, 6 - including the
36. Several strains of this attack have been labeled for convenience as one group
- critical legal studies. See Gordon, Legal Historiographies, 36 STAN. L. REV. 199
(1984). According to some critical legal scholars, legal reasoning and law are indeter-
minate. This means that legal decision-making can only be explained "by reference to
criteria outside the scope of the judge's formal justifications." Singer, The Player and
the Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94 YALE L. J. 1, 19-20 (1984). The critical
legal theorists also take issue with much of the realist dogma. "However, the thrust of
Realist Scholarship was essentially negative and inconoclastic; it lacked any unifying
thread or positive political program. Thus while the Realists accepted the indetermi-
nacy of legal reasoning, they remained firmly committed to liberalism." Hutchinson at
204. The movement shares with the realists, however, a disdain for the science of law
approach: "Legal reasoning is not distinct, as a method of reaching correct results,
from ethical, and political discourse in general (i.e., from policy analysis) ...Put
another way, everything taught, except the formal rules themselves and the argumenta-
tive techniques for manipulating them, is policy and nothing more." D. KENNEDY, LE-
GAL EDUCATION AND THE REPRODUCTION OF HIERARCHY: A POLEMIC AGAINST THE
SYSTEM 20-22 (1983).
In addition,
Several observers of critical legal scholars have concluded that: "Like
traditional jurists, the Critical scholars are obsessed with the judicial func-
tion and its alleged central importance for an understanding of law in soci-
ety. Yet while they share this infatuation, they adopt a radically different
view of the judicial process: All the Critical scholars unite in denying the
rational determinacy of legal reasoning. Their basic credo neither operates
in a historical vacuum nor does it exist independently of ideological strug-
gles in society.
Hutchinson at 206.
Recently, two law professors wrote that:
[O]ur unease about our graduates as lawyers is not a unique product of
our situation at a regional nonelite law school. Professors at elite law
schools may have more confidence in the prospects of their graduates. If
they do, however, it is because their students arrive at law school with
many of the qualities that make success more likely.
Feinman and Feldman at 880. These professors have created a course which focuses on
the overlap between contracts and torts. This course, which they call "contorts," ac-
cepts the premise that the "traditional organizing categories - contract and torts -
fail to provide meaningful distinctions." Id. at 887. This leads them to consciously at-
tempt to prepare students for the "inherent ambiguity in . . .legal discourse." Id.
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premise that judicial decision-making is largely determinate - to the
view that the skewed forms of the dominant vision have minimized the
interpersonal "humanistic" aspect of law and lawyering 7
37. This group, which has been labeled the "humanists," are perhaps best repre-
sented by E. DVORKIN, J. HIMMELSMITH, H. LESNICK, BECOMING A LAWYER: A Hu-
MANISTIC PERSPECTIVE ON LEGAL EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONALISM (1981) and the
program adopted at C.U.N.Y. Law School at Queens College. The "humanities" have
been defined as "the system of values, traditions and customs with which we live and
which we may wish to change." Byman, Humanities and the Law School Experience,
35 J. LEGAL ED. 76 (1985). The humanists' stated purpose is to broaden "the scope of
traditional education to include a focus upon the persons of teachers and students, the
human dimensions underlying the subject matter, and the experience of learning." Id.
The goal of this approach, however, "is not to replace the traditional strengths of the
profession, but to include them in a larger context." Id.
The humanists also reject the conception of law as a laboratory science to be
gleamed from and understood through appellate case reports. They seek in legal educa-
tion to reunite efforts at technical proficiency and other aspects of human life. Simi-
larly, they believe the professionalization process of law school has profound conse-
quences for students and, after graduation, the community-at-large. Thus, the
humanists abandon the narrow goal of orthodox legal education - to teach students to
'think like a lawyer' - in favor of a broader notion of professional responsibility.
Humanists adopt a radical restructuring of the goals of legal education and of the
means used to achieve those goals. Several law schools have adopted some of these
humanist principles in implementing new approaches to legal education. The C.U.N.Y.
Law School was conceived and staffed by several of the leading humanist scholars. The
University of Montana School of Law, established in 1911, revised its first year curric-
ulum in 1984 after an extensive reevaluation. The predecessor to these schools was
Antioch Law School, which integrated clinical and substantive law training in an effort
to train lawyers in large part for public interest and poverty law careers.
The University of Montana's criticisms of the orthodox method of instruction are
particularly interesting because the University's changes came on the heels of a lengthy
tradition. The faculty committee assigned to analyze the first-year curriculum com-
plained that the appellate case method approach had too narrow a focus, was the
wrong end of the judicial process to show students first, encourages passive learning,
becomes redundant, does not provide adequate skills training, and omits the necessary
social science context by continuing to voice a "science of law" ideology. Montana
Report at 6-7.
An additional recent critique was offered by Professor Warren Schwartz of Ge-
orgetown University Law Center. Professor Schwartz proposed curriculum reform
based on the assumption that "the two objectives of legal education are to improve our
understanding of how governments function and how they ought to function."
Schwartz, The Failure of Economics in Legal Education: The Prospects For a New
Model Curriculum, 33 J. LEGAL ED. 314 (1983). The courses Schwartz proposed were:
"(1) Government Coercion and the Allocation of Resources, (2) Government Coercion
and the Just Distribution of Social Products, (3) Government Process, (4) Empirical
Methodology and (5) Law and Culture." Id. at 316.
504 [Vol. 10
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T: Your historical analysis, however, certainly indicates that the ortho-
dox model has been extremely durable and adaptable. And looking at
the success of the students who have been taught under the orthodox
case-oriented approach, it also appears that the model is effective. Per-
haps there are good reasons for the model's success?
For example, legal education orthodoxy divides up the substantive
areas of law into manageable components that are recognized in the
practice of law. These components include labor law, taxation, com-
mercial law, and the like. In the first year, students are thoroughly
schooled in the fundamentals of private law, from torts to contracts.3 8
They are also taught a whole new style of analysis endemic to the legal
profession. This analysis teaches them to "think like lawyers. '3 9 . The
study of appellate cases "works the mind," challenging the intellectual
capacities of the students. Through a careful analysis of the cases, stu-
dents truly learn about doctrines of law, and the policies underlying
those doctrines. When students read appellate case reports, they gain
insights into judicial decision-making and the application of legal prin-
ciples. Thus, it's reasonable to believe that the only raw materials a law
student truly requires for a proper legal education are a pen, paper,
and a casebook containing appellate case reports.
,t;X,
Conversation between 2 professors
38. A typical first-year program for law students includes courses in legal writ-
ing, civil procedure, torts, contracts, property and criminal law. The orientation of
these courses, with the possible exception of contracts, and its study of the Uniform
Commercial Code, and criminal law and the analysis of the Model Penal Code, is on
the common law.
39. See, e.g. Motley, The Law School Essay .Exam: A Foolish Consistency, 10
NOVA L.J. 723 (1986).
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The argument that the dominance of case analysis has excluded all
other forms of legal education, moreover, is simply inaccurate. In the
second and third years of study, students at most schools have the op-
tion of participating in a clinical program,40 or interning with practic-
ing attorneys. The division of academic and clinical training in this
manner is similar to the formats used in other graduate programs, such
as medical training. Saving clinical programs for a later point in a stu-
dent's education permits a student to apply the academic classroom
learning of the first two years of school. The argument that legal edu-
cation has an insufficient nexus to lawyering, moreover, is specious.
Students take a course in legal writing41 and have the opportunity to
practice their appellate advocacy, 42 in addition to whatever clinical or
simulation courses they may choose to attend.
The orthodox case-oriented method, moreover, is not confined to
the study of core courses such as contracts, torts, constitutional law,
property and the like. Students also are schooled in legal ethics, and
may learn about the relationship of law to other disciplines in courses
specifically devoted to the interaction of law with the social sciences.
Besides, don't you miss the mark when you attack the Socratic
method?4 3 That method involves posing a series of thought-provoking
questions to students about a case, forcing students to think about the
cases and actively piece together applicable rules and principles. While
the method may cause students to struggle to understand concepts, it is
precisely this struggle that permits students to learn to think like a
lawyer.
40. "It is primarily the failure of American law schools to graduate attorneys
competent in lawyering skills that has buoyed the movement for clinical law school
training." Seligman at 160.
A broadly-defined clinical program may be run by the school or may consist of an
"externship" with a state or local agency, or even a private law firm. The student in a
clinical program generally has a participatory role, from assisting on written memo-
randa to the court, to actually trying cases as a student-prosecutor.
41. The legal writing course in most schools is generally a one- credit or two-
credit course in the first year. The course is often pass/fail, and may be combined with
legal research and ethics.
42. This generally occurs in the first-year moot court competition.
43. The Socratic method, as it is called, generally is considered to be a teaching
technique in which a series of questions are put to students. By tying together the series
of questions and answers, a new insight or point is illuminated. Interestingly, the So-
cratic method as it is practiced in law schools today is likely much different
than the teaching technique applied by Socrates, after whom the method was named.
See BROWN, V PERSPECTIVE 6 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Brown].
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Z: If I may now interrupt; I really must disagree with your assertion
that I am attacking what is called the Socratic method. While I per-
sonally am not a proponent of that method, I strongly believe that aca-
demic freedom protects the many different styles of law teachers. This
would include the Socratic style. The Socratic method is swept into the
critique of appellate case report analysis only incidentally, since the So-
cratic method often occurs in the context of case analysis.
T: And you ask whether this system works? One need only look as far
as the nearest bright and successful lawyer - of which there are
thousands.
Z: Contrary to your assumption, I do not view the "success" of law
graduates as a measure of the orthodox model's vitality. Students may
succeed despite their law school education, not because of it. The rele-
vant issue is whether legal education orthodoxy can improve its design
and delivery of legal instruction.
III.
T: Well, what exactly is it about case analysis that has you reconsider-
ing its utility?
Z: To best answer your question, perhaps it would be helpful if I first
state my assumptions. I presume that effective lawyering involves a se-
ries of processes extending far beyond the intellectual sifting of appel-
late case reports. For a lawyer to solve a problem or complete a task,
she must generally first listen to the statement of the problem, sort out
or separate the information received, analyze the information - ar-
ranging the facts, identifying the applicable law, and then applying the
law to the facts - and finally communicate the processed information
to others." An effective training would include rigourous and direct
attention to each of these phases of lawyering.
Case analysis, however, fails to undertake such rigorous skills
training. Within case analysis, general skills such as listening are likely
to be completely overlooked, and law-specific skills such as fact ar-
rangement or development are probably confronted only incidentally.
Consequently, students graduate without understanding or practicing
44. The skill of communication is touched upon briefly in law school in appellate
advocacy. The consideration, however is only peripheral. The focus of the oral advocacy
program is primarily upon oral legal analysis. The skill of communication should be a
more direct focus of legal education. Students need to learn to speak precisely and
clearly; this requires practice of the type not generally offered in law school today.
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significant aspects of lawyers, and are forced to obtain many of these
skills from on-the-job training.
This defect in appellate case analysis is partially built-in. Opinions
at the appellate stage of a proceeding present the reader with
"prepackaged" facts and issues. This affords students little opportunity
to identify and practice those skills.45
T: Are there any other deficiencies?
Z: The analysis of appellate case reports is also deficient because the
appellate phase of a case is not representative of the entire judicial pro-
cess. Appellate case reports do not provide students with sufficient ex-
posure to the trial stage of a case, where a careful crafting of facts
often determines success, or to the pre-trial stage of a case, where strat-
egy, development of facts, and negotiation with opposing counsel often
are dispositive.48 For example, students do not often use documents
during the educational process, and generally do not know how to deal
with them upon entering practice. Students are often equally unfamil-
iar with complaints, motions, transcripts of trials and the like,47 except
for those students who take upper level clinic, intern or simulation
classes. 8
A corollary problem to the lack of attention paid to different
phases of the judicial process is the misleading implication to students.
Students end up believing that the trial and pre-trial stages of litiga-
tion, and lawyerly functions like document analysis, are distinct from
and even secondary to "pure" legal analysis.
A further deficiency occurs from the focus of orthodox case analy-
45.
The report of an appellate case . . . only presents those facts which have
already been determined to be legally relevant. Most of the analysis has
already been done sub silentio in the process of formulating a single nar-
row issue which alone remains for determination. The remaining issue,
however, is often highly obtuse and arises out of an untypical fact situa-
tion, otherwise there would hardly be an appealable issue.
Montana Report at 7.
46. "The trouble is that the mindset of the students is on litigation and litigation
only. There was not in their thinking process negotiation, settlement, compromise, col-
laboration or deal- making." Brown at 1345.
47. "After a year of traditional instruction reading appellate cases, students usu-
ally have not seen a complaint, an answer . . . The raw materials of appellate cases
remain abstractions." Montana Report at 6.
48. These include "in-school" clinical courses and extern programs whereby stu-
dents participate in community legal programs, as well as certain simulation courses
such as pre-trial practice.
[Vol. 10
14
Nova Law Review, Vol. 10, Iss. 2 [1986], Art. 15
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol10/iss2/15
Friedland
sis on private law,49 particularly in the first year of school when courses
such as torts, contracts and property are common fare. As a result of
this private law orientation, the study of other sources of law, particu-
larly legislation or administrative regulations, have been effectively re-
stricted to the second and third years of school. This suggests to stu-
dents that the primary source of law today is the common law. While
this may or may not have been historically correct, a strong case cer-
tainly can be made that prolific legislatures have increased codification
of common law rules to meet the demands of an increasingly technolog-
ical society, thus shifting the primary source of law from the common
law to the legislative and administrative areas. The excessive focus of
case analysis on private law in the first year of instruction thus not only
misleads students about the relative importance of statutory law, but
also fails to supply students with a sufficient ability to understand and
interpret statutes or administrative regulations.50
On a different level, the repetitive study of appellate case reports
and case components often has a negative impact on students, creating
what I call a "blinders" effect. This effect occurs when students are
overwhelmed by the mass of minutae in the cases, causing them to lose
sight of the forest because they are concentrating too hard on the trees.
Similarly, the case method fails to accurately and adequately con-
vey to students how legal doctrine ties into legal ethics, economics, the
promotion of different values, or other dimensions of lawyering. The
traditional law curriculum separates cases and courses by legal con-
cepts without generally providing the linkage between cases or subjects.
T: Does your critique extend to casebooks?51
Z: Very much so. The use of casebooks as the conduit of appellate case
analysis perpetuates and further limits the orthodox methodology. The
reliance on casebooks is by no means unexpected. In an educational
process dominated by the case method, it is almost a matter of course
49. "Private" law generally means the common law. In comparison, "public" law
is generally composed of statutes or administrative regulations.
50.
[R]eading appellate cases ... fails to provide the students with a system-
atic overview of the legal system as a whole, its origins, its current fea-
tures, and its operation. This approach also creates an early impression
that appellate cases are the primary source of law and minimizes the im-
portance of legislation and administrative rules.
Montana Report at 6.
51. "Case" books are textbooks that primarily contain edited versions of impor-
tant appellate case reports as well as comments and questions about the cases.
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that textbooks contain mostly appellate case reports.
Extreme reliance on these books, though, has several drawbacks.
Since casebooks generally omit the briefs and oral arguments of the
parties, students do not observe how lawyers present their case - how
the arguments are emphasized or arranged, or how the facts are
presented. Even when dissenting opinions are included in the text, all of
the views presented to the students are from a judicial perspective. This
perspective, while useful, may likely not be a complete substitute in
educational value for the arguments and issue formulations of the
parties.
The editing of cases also creates problems. A heavily-edited case
makes it difficult for the student to visualize the full range of consider-
ations presented by the facts and legal arguments. Students often are
not exposed to how a case originated, what its specific facts are, and
how those facts gave rise to the issues, among other things. A casebook
may utilize only that portion of a case report that pertains to a solitary
issue within the case. Although this may be readily justifiable on effi-
ciency grounds, a pigeonholing of cases by issue further distorts the
student perspective of the propositions for which important cases stand,
and deprives students of the opportunity to practice identifying and
separating the various issues that are being confronted within a legal
problem.
The use of casebooks, combined with the underlying belief that the
law is derived from cases, also serves to limit the flexibility of the edu-
cational process. The settled expectations of teacher and student often
are such that the substantive52 materials in the casebook are not only
expected to define the coverage of the course but to provide the priori-
ties of the course as well. Unless the teacher provides a significant
group of supplementary materials, the course is constrained by the
adopted textbook.53 If the teacher does provide supplementary materi-
als, there is a natural and perhaps reasonable assumption by students
that those materials are less important than the text.
Finally, I come to the defects of the methodology of case analysis
itself. The case analysis method is inductive, 54 leaving for students the
derivation of the parameters of rules and principles. Unfortunately, stu-
52. The word "substantive" refers to cases specifically and doctrines generally.
53. Some teachers end up structuring an entire course around supplementary
materials.
54. "Inductive" reasoning means to generate general principles from specific
examples.
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dents often are not provided with sufficient feedback about whether the
framework of analysis they construct is an appropriate one. This is not
to suggest that students should be "fed" answers, but to say that the
rudiments of analysis should be better communicated during instruc-
tion so that students will have the tools by which to capably resolve
legal problems. For example, it may be important in a statute-based
course for the teacher to emphasize that in resolving legal problems the
initial reference for the student is to the statute itself. An attempt to
convey this information indirectly through case analysis will likely be a
less than adequate substitute.
The analysis of appellate case reports, moreover, has additional de-
ficiencies. Case analysis often sends students confusing messages, if
only because several messages are in fact being sent in close proximity.
Cases are often analyzed for distinct reasons. Within the broad um-
brella of doctrinal analysis, the focus may be on the judicial decision-
making process, or on the application of the rules and principles de-
rived from cases to different fact patterns. Since the dominant case
method accepts that students are not supposed to be expressly told
what exactly they should learn from reading a case and why they are to
learn it, students are often fog-bound as to the real reasons cases are
being discussed, and what they are supposed to look for in them. 5 One
need only ask students what they look for when reading a case, or what
they are supposed to learn from it, to see the extent of the confusion
surrounding the orthodox methodology. The confusion, or to be more
accurate, the lack of understanding about the purpose of the methodol-
ogy, even extends to second and third year students as well as to those
in their first year.56
This failure to specifically illuminate the purpose and content of
doctrinal analysis often prevents students from enhancing their under-
standing of case analysis on their own during the three years of law
school, and may sap students of the motivation to improve their skills
during the course of a semester. While the stagnation of second and
55. The bewilderment of legal education is caused by "using cases as the primary
material of instruction, but we hardly ever teach the doctrine of precedent. We go on
offering basic courses in contracts and torts in the first year, but many teachers of these
subjects spend a good deal of time proving that there really is no such thing as 'law of
contracts' or 'law of torts."' Berman at 350.
56. For example, students in a second-year law school class were asked why they
read cases, and what they looked for when reading them. The responses varied, but
indicated that students really did not have a firm grasp as to what methodology was
being used and why it was being used to train them.
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third year students is not excused by this observation, it perhaps ex-
plains in part why students rapidly become disinterested in the repeti-
tive review of cases in the second and third years of school."7
The lack of a particularized definition of doctrinal analysis,58 and
consequently the lack of an understanding of how to do it correctly,
spawns a related problem. Students who are expected to learn the law
through the inductive case method but apparently do not, as evidenced
by an unsatisfactory course grade, often feel dejected and lose motiva-
tion to improve. The commonly voiced lament is that the student is a
"C" student regardless of the effort he or she puts in. The student may
attribute the lack of success to the failure to understand case analysis.
Yet students often literally only have a series of oblique clues about
how to do case analysis, and the grade received may be attributable to
any one of a number of variables.
The lack of a clear understanding of what constitutes doctrinal
analysis also has a significant impact on students who aspire to a suc-
cessful academic performance. These students, unclear about the pur-
pose and content of the methodology, turn to what they perceive the
teacher "wants," and how the teacher "thinks" - instead of taking the
initiative to learn what the law is, how it was formulated, or what its
significance is. The result all too often is unnecessary disillusionment,
and the perpetuation of passive, reactive students who do not play an
active role in the learning process.
Perhaps the greatest failing of the case method is, in fact, its ten-
dency to foster a passive/dependent approach by students to their legal
education. The socialization of students weaned on the case method
leads them to become dependent upon the teachers - the questions
they pose, the comments they make about the cases - and on the
casebooks. Independent questioning and thought is not sufficiently en-
couraged or facilitated by case analysis for the average student.5 9 The
lack of a directed framework of analysis and the absence of stated
goals in reading cases may lead students to read cases for substantive
content and not much more. Even when dissenting opinions are in-
57. Students often may be heard to complain about the repetition of case
analysis.
58. Doctrinal analysis, in the way it is generally practiced, has no substantive
meaning for students. (Even exams don't bring doctrinal analysis in focus, since most
exams use "issue-spotting" fact patterns.)
59. "Most students rapidly concluded that the study of law is the study of rules."
Montana Report at 6.
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cluded in the text, for example, students may take advantage of their
inclusion by relying on them as a crutch instead of formulating
counter-arguments on their own. While this passivity may in part be
attributed to several factors, such as the existence of one set of exams
at the end of each semester and the lack of feedback during the semes-
ter, the stated design of the case method - to provoke questioning on
the part of the students - simply doesn't work well enough.
IV.
T: How would you implement your model?
Z: The model posits that training, whether it be athletic, vocational, or
professional of any kind, involves breaking down aggregate activities
into fundamental skills. Thus, a similar division and identification of
fundamental skills should occur in the legal education process. Specific
skills, such as listening, fact analysis, issue formulation, identifying, ex-
tending and comparing holdings of cases, statutory analysis, regulatory
analysis, and clear and concise communication, should receive direct
attention in class. For example, students may practice listening skills
by having questions put to them as to what they heard other students
say. The questioned student can be asked to reformulate or clarify the
original speaker's expression. In all likelihood, students do not listen
carefully enough to what other students say in class and do not practice
reformulating or simplifying concepts and expressions.
Direct attention may also be given in class to improving students'
advocacy skills. Students may be taught to identify and manipulate
forms of argument. Case reports or briefs of the parties may be used to
help identify and counter different types of arguments. Students may
learn, for example, whether the court declined to resolve an issue as a
matter of judicial competence, or to label the type of argument made
by the proponent of a right. Thus, by giving models of argument direct
attention, students should be better able to respond to arguments
presented by other lawyers, or to formulate ones of their own.
T: But aren't you simply advocating spoon-feeding?
Z: Not by any means. I agree that students will not actively learn ma-
terial, and more importantly, really understand that material if they
are simply fed information by a teacher. Rather, "hiding the ball" to
encourage inquisitiveness has appeal. But under the orthodox model, it
is unclear what is being hidden and why. I just don't see how the kind
of confusion the orthodox model generates serves as a helpful means or
end to the legal process. Instead, to maximize the efficiency of the prac-
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tice of fundamentals, students should be expressly told what is being
practiced, why it is being practiced, and how that skill fits into the
overall schematic. While students are therefore assisted by the teachers
in developing a framework of analysis, they are is still left to imple-
ment the framework on his or her own and to refine the identified skills.
Students can play a more active role in their education by partici-
pating in more simulations in basic courses, in more individualized
classroom exercises, or, on a different level, by formulating and refining
a series of general questions that they ask themselves when analyzing a
legal problem. Students can and should be directly taught to structure
their own questioning processes in reading cases and attacking legal
problems throughout the semester, not just when preparing for finals.
Class time can be specifically set aside to erect a framework or
frameworks of analysis and to discuss the questions students are asking
themselves.
T: Isn't this more spoon-feeding?
Z: No, because the framework of analysis is only a necessary first step
students must take. Students are still left to probe and sift through the
facts, issues, arguments and values, determining what's important and
what's not. Students are simply being shown the importance of such
frameworks.
Significantly, the practice of "framework development" and other
skills can readily occur outside of class. For example, students could
practice issue formulation and fact arrangement through periodic take-
home assignments involving unedited fact patterns. These assignments
could range from drafting motions to responding to a court's question
at trial.
T: Doesn't your model have a second major component?
Z: The second component of the new model involves a multi-dimen-
sional approach to legal problem solving. As part of this approach, ap-
pellate case analysis plays less than an all-encompassing role in a well-
rounded legal education. Thus, students must be shown different parts
of the process such as the trial and pretrial stages, and receive an inte-
grated view of the different layers of legal problems. So, for example, a
question of ethics can be discussed in conjunction with a problem about
the rules governing the filing of an answer in federal court, or the reso-
lution at a case can be discussed in terms of its economy or political
expediency. In essence, student awareness of the roles played by polit-
ics, judicial values, interviewing skills, fact gathering and the many
other dimensions of legal problems, and of the relationship of these
dimensions to the entire process, should paint a more realistic and use-
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ful picture for the student.
T: What about feedback?
Z: This model relies on the systematic and regular distribution of feed-
back to students. Without that, their skills would not improve effi-
ciently, and students also would have less impetus to better those skills.
Feedback can take the form of a series of short written assignments
during the semester which are reviewed by the professor, or even pass/
fail oral examinations.6" An oral examination, for example, can serve
several purposes, not the least of which is immediate feedback from the
professor. The professor can also learn from such an examination how
effectively concepts and points are being communicated to the students.
While oral examinations would obviously require a teacher to devote
more time to the educational development of students, even ten minutes
spent with students in small groups or on an individual basis may prove
more productive overall than several large class meetings.
T: Does the new model necessitate modifying the traditional law school
curriculum?
Z: To a certain extent, I suppose so. The curriculum should reflect and
emphasize the specific skills used in lawyering and provide the students
with an accurate "big picture" of law and lawyering. Thus, for exam-
ple, I would advocate a three-year writing program, integrated with the
substantive courses. I would also support a greater emphasis on statu-
tory and regulatory law in the first year, more simulation or clinical
experiences at an earlier time, and the integration of ethics and the
social sciences into the mainstream of legal education. I would also
contemplate a reorganization of some course content on a functional
basis. Perhaps "wrongs to others" could be taught as one course, or
public law as another. It is not so much the restructuring of the tradi-
tional curriculum that is required for the new model to be effective, but
rather the de-emphasis of case analysis in, and the adoption of a skills/
multi-dimensional and integrated approach to, legal instruction.
V.
T: It is getting late. Any concluding remarks?
Z: The traditional model of legal education provides deficient training
60. Oral examinations have been tried by law teachers in different circum-
stances. The advantages of pass/fail exams as a supplement to written course require-
ments are many. Students often find oral examinations in which there is instantaneous
feedback and commentary from the professor to be especially productive.
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for law students because it over-emphasisizes the doctrinal analysis of
appellate case reports. A new model, focusing on specific lawyering
skills and a multi-dimensional approach to law and legal problem solv-
ing would overcome many of the orthodox model's deficiencies. The
Langdellian era of case analysis may indeed have been the "Glory
Days" of legal education, but maybe it's time to "stop sitting back try-
ing to recapture a little of the glory of."'"
61. B. Springsteen, Glory Days, BORN IN THE U.S.A. (1985).
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